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STATEMENT QF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with jurisdiction over
the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e)
(2002).
STATEMENT QF ISSUES / STANDARDS QF REVIEW
1.

Whether

the

trial

court

abused

its

discretion by

allowing the State to introduce evidence of Ms. Reddish's prior
drug conviction, wrongs, or bad acts.

The trial court's decision

to admit or reject evidence of prior crimes, wrongs or acts is
reviewed by the appellate court for abuse of discretion.
Allen,

State v.

2005 UT 11, Hl5, 108 P.3d 730; State v. Decorso,

57, 1Jl8, 993 P.2d 837.

1999 UT

However, because such a decision is a

mixed question of law and fact, the admission of prior crimes,
wrongs or acts "must be scrupulously examined by trial judges in
the proper exercise of that discretion."
Preservation

Ms.

of Issue

Reddish

Citation

preserved

or Statement

this

issue

by

Id.

(citation omitted).

of Grounds

way

of

her

for

Review:

counsel's

objections and arguments set forth at R. 210:211 and R. 210:21314.
2.
duty

to

"Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal
resolve

on

the

record

the

accuracy

of

contested

information in sentencing reports is a question of law that [the

1

State

v.

Veteto,

of Grounds

for

Review.

appellate court] review[s] for correctness."
2000 UT 62, Hl3, 6 P.3d 1133.
Preservation

of Issue

Citation

or Statement

Ms. Reddish preserved this issue by way of her objection set forth
at page 34-35 of the 03/17/05 Sentencing Transcript.
3.

Whether appointed trial counsel denied Ms. Reddish of

the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel
by

failing

to request

that the trial

court

utilize

its fact

finding function to resolve the inaccuracy in the presentence
investigation report.
show,

first,

that

To make such a showing, a defendant must

counsel

rendered

a

deficient

performance,

falling below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance was prejudicial.
Bundy

v. DeLand,

763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988) .

reviews such a claim as a matter of law.

The appellate court

State

v.

Maestas,

1999

UT 32, H20, 984 P.2d 376.
Preservation
Issues

of Issue

involving

Citation

claims

of

or Statement

of Grounds

for

Review:

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel

constitute an exception to the preservation rule and as such may
be raised for the first time on appeal.

2

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative,
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the failure of the trial court to properly
analyze the elicited testimony and presentation of evidence of Ms.
Reddish's

prior

drug

conviction

under Utah

Rule

of

Evidence

404 (b) .

Moreover, this case involves the failure by both the

trial court and appointed trial counsel to deal appropriately with
an inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report brought to
the court's attention in a timely manner.

These failures at

sentencing precluded Ms. Reddish of a fair sentencing hearing.
The State charged Ms. Reddish with one count of Possession or
Use of a Controlled Substance (Prior), a second-degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) , one count of
Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance

(Prior), a class A

misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) , one
count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l), and one count of
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a class B.

3

Misdemeanor,

in violation of Utah Code Ann.

§ 41-6-44.

Ms.

Reddish appeared before the district court and pleaded not guilty.
Ms. Reddish appeared for a jury trial, during which she
testified in her own behalf.

The jury, upon the conclusion of

trial, deliberated for less than an hour and a half, after which
it convicted Ms. Reddish as charged.
The trial court referred Ms. Reddish to the Adult Parole and
Probation Department for a presentence investigation report.

At

sentencing, newly appointed trial counsel informed the trial court
of a discrepancy in the presentence investigation report.
Based

upon

the

conviction

of

Controlled Substance, a second-degree

Possession

or

Use

of

a

felony, the trial court

sentenced Ms. Reddish "to an indeterminate term of not less than
one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison",
which the trial court suspended.

The trial court then sentenced

Defendant to a term of 180 days in the Davis County Jail.
trial court also imposed the following sentences:

The

(1) for the

conviction of Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a class
A misdemeanor, the trial court sentenced Ms. Reddish to a term of
365

days

suspended;

in

the

(2)

Davis

for

the

County

Jail,

conviction

which
of

the

trial

Possession

of

court
Drug

Paraphernalia, a class B Misdemeanor, the trial court sentenced
Ms. Reddish to a term of 180 days in the Davis County Jail, which
4

the trial court suspended; and (3) for the conviction of Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol / Drugs, a class B Misdemeanor, the
trial court sentenced Ms. Reddish to a term of 180 days in the
Davis County Jail, which the trial court also suspended.

The

trial court placed Mr. Reddish on probation for three years.

Ms.

Reddish appealed.

STATEMENT QF FACTS
1.

Ms. Reddish was charged with was charged with one count

of Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance (Prior), a seconddegree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i),
one count of Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance (Prior),
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 58-378(2) (a) (i) , one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l), and
one count of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs,
a class B. Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44
(R. 86-87) . See Amended Information, R. 86-87, a true and correct
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A.
2.

On

June

10, 2004, Ms. Reddish

appeared

before

the

district court and pleaded not guilty (R. 19-20) .
3.

Ms. Reddish appeared for a jury trial on January 25,

2005 (R. 88-90).

5

4.

During the course of the trial, Ms. Reddish testified in

her own behalf (R. 210:180-224).
5.

On cross-examination, the State elicited the following

testimony from Ms. Reddish:
Defendant:

He never even told me what I was being
arrested for, actually.
Okay.
I found out in jail.
But you did tell the officer that you
had a pirior conviction for meth? Seven
years No, I did not. I never did. No. It's

Prosecutor:
Defendant:
Prosecutor:

Defendant:

nothing I brag about.
(R. 210:210:12-17).
6.

Defense

reference

counsel

objected,

to Ms. Reddish's prior

arguing

that

drug-related

the

State's

conviction

was

improper under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence

(R.

210:210-11; 210:213-14).
7.

The trial court, after entertaining argument, ruled that

the State's reference to the prior conviction was
because

admissible

it goes to the intent of Ms. Reddish to possess the

controlled

substances

found

in her car

(R. 210:215-16).

In

addition, the trial court concluded that "the probative value on
the intent issue rises above the level of the prejudicial issue."
(R. 210:215-16).

6

8.

The jury, upon the conclusion of trial, deliberated for

less than an hour and a half, after which it convicted Ms. Reddish
as charged (R. 89; R. 121-22).
9.

The trial court referred Ms. Reddish to the Adult Parole

and Probation Department for a presentence investigation report
(R. 210:303:21-23).
10.
counsel

At sentencing, on March 17, 2005, newly appointed trial
informed

the

trial

court

of

a

discrepancy

in the

presentence investigation report (03/17/05 Sentencing Transcript,
pp. 34-35).

Ms. Reddish disputed the 11/26/83 conviction for

possession / use of a controlled substance as set forth on page 5
of the presentence investigation report.

See R. 211, presentence

investigation report, p. 5, section B, a true and correct copy of
which is attached hereto as Addendum D.

The alleged error was not

discussed further.
11.

Based upon the conviction of Possession or Use of a

Controlled Substance, a second-degree felony, the trial court
sentenced Ms. Reddish "to an indeterminate term of not less than
one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison",
which the trial court suspended (R. 162) . See Sentence, Judgment,
Commitment, R. 161-65, a true and correct copy of which is
attached hereto as Addendum C.

The trial court then sentenced

Defendant to a term of 180 days in the Davis County Jail
1

(Id.).

The trial court also imposed the following sentences:

(1) for

the conviction of Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a
class A misdemeanor, the trial court sentenced Ms. Reddish to a
term of 3 65 days in the Davis County Jail, which the trial court
suspended;

(2)

for

the

conviction

of

Possession

of

Drug

Paraphernalia, a class B Misdemeanor, the trial court sentenced
Ms. Reddish to a term of 180 days in the Davis County Jail, which
the trial court suspended; and (3) for the conviction of Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol / Drugs, a class B Misdemeanor, the
trial court sentenced Ms. Reddish to a term of 180 days in the
Davis County Jail, which the trial court also suspended

(Id.).

The trial court placed Ms. Reddish on probation for three years
(Id.).

12.

Ms. Reddish, through appointed appellate counsel, filed

a timely Notice of Appeal on April 29, 2005 (R. 167-70).
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court abused its discretion by allowing the

State, in the course of cross-examination, to elicit and introduce
evidence of Ms. Reddish's six or seven-year-old drug conviction,
wrong, or bad act.
admitting

evidence

possession of meth.

The trial court abused its discretion by
of

Ms.

Reddish's

prior

conviction

for

The record demonstrates that evidence of Ms.

8

Reddish's

prior

drug

character purpose.

conviction

was

not

offered

for

a non-

Moreover, the prior drug conviction some six

or seven years ago does not satisfy the requirements of Utah Rule
of Evidence 4 02.
The

record

also

demonstrates

that

the

evidence

of

Ms.

Reddish's prior drug conviction was less than probative of any
material fact to the crimes charged.

Finally, the trial court

erred by concluding that the evidence of Ms. Reddish's prior drug
conviction met the requirements of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
2.

The trial court erred by failing to determine on the

record the accuracy of contested information contained in the
presentence investigation report.

The record demonstrates that

the trial court failed to duly consider the inaccuracy set forth
in the presentence investigation report.

Further, the trial court

failed to make a determination on the record of whether the
information was relevant to the issue of sentencing.
3.

Appointed trial counsel denied Ms. Reddish of her Sixth

Amendment Right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing
to request that the trial court utilize its fact finding function
to resolve the inaccuracy.

Appointed trial counsel's failure to

request that the trial court utilize its fact finding function to
resolve the inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report
9

fell

below

judgment.

an

objective

standard

of

reasonable

professional

But for counsel's unprofessional error of failing to

request that the trial court utilize its fact finding function,
the result at sentencing would have been different.

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING
THE STATE, IN THE COURSE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION, TO
ELICIT AND INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF MS. REDDISH'S SIX
OR SEVEN-YEAR-OLD DRUG CONVICTION, WRONG, OR BAD
ACT.
A.

Admissibility of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts
Evidence Generally

As a fundamental principle of law, a person may be convicted
criminally only for his or her acts and not for his or her general
State

character.

v.

Saunders,

1999 UT 59, 1l5, 992 P.2d 951.

This fundamental principle is violated "if a conviction is based
on an inference

that

conviction

is justified

because

of

the

defendant's criminal character or propensity to commit bad acts."
Id.

"The admission of evidence of prior crimes may have such a

powerful tendency to mislead the finder of fact as to subvert the
constitutional principle that a defendant may be convicted only if
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a specific crime charged."
Id.

(citing

(1970)).

In

re Winship,

397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct.

1068

Hence, the law has long prohibited the admission of

prior crime evidence unless the proffered evidence is probative of
10

an issue other than criminal propensity or character and is not
Id.

unduly prejudicial.

"The rule limiting the admissibility of

evidence of prior crimes, as presently stated in rule 404(b) of
the Utah Rules of Evidence, has existed for almost a century in
this state."

Id.

(string citation omitted).

Supreme Court, in State v.
837,

addressed

and

articulated in State

Decorso,

limited
v.

1999 UT 57, KK12-35, "

prior

Doporto,

Although the Utah

statements

of

3

the

p

-2d

rule

935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997), "the

basic concepts embodied in the rule limiting the use of prior
Id.

crime evidence remain intact."
B.
Utah

Rule

Rule 404(b) Analysis
of

Evidence

4 04 (b) governs

the

evidence of other crimes, wrongs, and bad acts.

admission

of

Rule 404(b)

provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.
It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity,
intent,
preparation,
plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident . . . .
Utah R. Evid. 4 04(b).

Prior to deciding whether evidence of other

crimes, wrongs, and bad acts is admissible under Rule 404(b), "the
trial court must determine
offered

(1) whether such evidence is being

for a proper, noncharacter purpose under 404(b),

11

(2)

whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3)
State

whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403."
v.

Nelson-Waggoner,

Decorso,

2000 UT 59, fl6, 6 P.3d 1120 (citing State

v.

1999 UT 57, 1(21-22, 29, 993 P.2d 837).

"A trial court's admission of evidence under rule 404(b) is
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard."
2002 UT 66, f56, 52 P. 3d 1210 (citing Decorso,
However,

"admission

of prior

crimes

State

v.

Bluff,

1999 UT 57 at 1fl8) .

evidence

itself

must

be

scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper exercise of
that discretion."

Decorso,

1999 UT 57 at Ul8 (citation omitted).

In the instant case, the State, during the cross-examination
of Ms. Reddish, wrongfully elicited and introduced evidence of Ms.
Reddish's prior drug conviction.

On the cross-examination, the

following exchange took place:
Defendant:
Prosecutor:
Defendant:
Prosecutor:

Defendant:

(R. 210:210:12-17).
that

the

State's

He never even told me what I was being
arrested for, actually.
Okay.
I found out in jail.
But you did tell the officer that you
had a prior conviction for meth? Seven
years No, 1 did not. I never did. No. It's
nothing I brag about.1

Defense counsel immediately objected, arguing
reference

to

X

Ms.

Reddish's

prior

criminal

A true and correct copy of the transcript containing the
exchange, the argument of counsel, and the trial court's ruling is
attached hereto as Addendum B.
12

conviction for possession of meth was improper under Rule 404(b)
of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Evidence

(R.

210:210-11;

210:213-14).

Further, defense counsel argued that the probative value did not
outweigh the prejudicial effect of such a damaging reference (R.
210:211:14-20).
The trial court, after entertaining argument, ruled that the
State's reference to the prior drug conviction of Ms. Reddish was
admissible because it goes to the intent of Ms. Reddish to possess
the

controlled

substances

found

in her

car

(R. 210:215-16).

Additionally, the trial court concluded that "the probative value
on the intent issue rises above the level of the prejudicial
issue." (R. 210:215-16) .
Under the first part of the test, the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting evidence of Ms. Reddish's prior conviction
for possession of meth.

The record demonstrates that evidence of

Ms. Reddish's prior drug conviction was not offered for a noncharacter purpose.
to

the

prior

Other than the cryptic reference by the State

conviction

on

cross-examination,

there

was

no

discussion or evidence taken by the trial court concerning the
surrounding circumstances or similarities between the prior drug
conviction

and

the

drug

charges

in

the

instant

case.

Consequently, the State all but failed to demonstrate a nexus

13

between the prior drug conviction and the alleged charges of
possession of controlled substances and drug paraphernalia.
Moreover, the prior drug conviction some six or seven years
ago does not satisfy the requirements of Utah Rule of Evidence
402.

According to Rule 402, "[e]vidence which is not relevant is

not admissible."

Utah R. Evid. 4 02.

"xRelevant evidence' means

evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
Utah R. Evid. 401.

"Other crime evidence is admissible if it

'tends to prove some fact that is material to the crime charged-other than the defendant's propensity to commit crime.'"

Bluff,

2002 UT 66 at f56.
The record demonstrates that the evidence of Ms. Reddish's
prior drug conviction was less than probative of any material fact
to the crimes charged.

Other than propensity to commit the crime,

evidence of Ms. Reddish's prior drug conviction did not tend to
prove a material fact of the crimes charged.

Due to the total

lack of evidence concerning the facts and circumstances of Ms.
Reddish's

prior

drug

conviction,

there

were

no

similarities

between Ms. Reddish's prior drug conviction and the alleged drug
related charges in the instant case.

14

Finally,
evidence

of

the
Ms.

trial

court

Reddish's

erred

prior

by

concluding

that

the

drug

conviction

met

the

In

State

requirements of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
v.

Shickles,

760 P.2d 291

(Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court

stated:
In deciding whether the danger of unfair
prejudice
and
the
like
substantially
outweighs the incremental probative value, a
variety of matters must be considered,
including the strength of the evidence as to
the commission of the other crime, the
similarities between the crimes, the interval
of time that has elapsed between the crimes,
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of
alternative proof, and the degree to which
the evidence probably will rouse the jury to
overmastering hostility.
Id.

at 295-96 (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick

565 (3d ed. 1984)); see
Ms.

Reddish

also

admitted

on Evidence

§ 190, at

Utah R. Evid. 403.2
as much when

confronted

on cross-

examination by the State concerning the prior drug conviction.
However, the conclusiveness of having a prior drug conviction for
possession of meth increased the likelihood that the jury would
and did convict Ms. Reddish based on her criminal character or
propensity to commit bad acts.

2

Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
"Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
15

The trial court failed to consider the similarities, if any,
between the crimes.

Moreover, the trial court failed to consider

the lack of proximity between the crimes or how the interval-oftime factor might affect the Rule 403 analysis.
The

need

for

the

evidence

as

well

as

the

efficacy

of

alternative proof was extremely low in the instant case.

For

example,

bag

the

State,

at

trial,

presented

evidence

of

a

allegedly found in Ms. Reddish's car, which contained controlled
substances and drug paraphernalia.

In short, the evidence of Ms.

Reddish's prior drug conviction was unnecessary to the State's
case, especially when considered in light of the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury based
solely on Ms. Reddish's criminal character or propensity to commit
bad acts.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DETERMINE
ON THE RECORD THE ACCURACY OF CONTESTED
INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT.

According
alleged

to Utah law, it is well-established

inaccuracies

in the presentence

that

"any

investigation report,

which have not been resolved by the parties and the department
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the
sentencing judge.

. . ."

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6) (a)

(Supp. 2005); State v. Maroney,

2004 UT App 206, %26, 94 P.3d 295.
16

"Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal duty to
resolve on the record the accuracy of contested information in
sentencing reports is a question of law that [the appellate court]
review[s] for correctness."

State

v.

Veteto,

2000 UT 62, fl3, 6

P.3d 1133.
A.

Duty to Consider Objections

As a matter of compliance, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a),
"requires the sentencing judge to consider the party's objections
to the report, make findings on the record as to whether the
information objected to is accurate, and determine on the record
whether that information is relevant to the issue of sentencing."
State

v.

Jaeger,

1999 UT 1, ^[44, 973 P. 2d 404; State

2004 UT App 206, H26, 94 P.3d 295.

v.

Maroney,

Nevertheless, "if a party

fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation
report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered
to be waived."
B.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (b) .
Failure of Sentencing Judge to Consider Objections

The record demonstrates that the trial court failed to duly
consider the inaccuracy set forth in the presentence investigation
report.

Ms. Reddish objected to the presentence investigation,

disputing the report's accuracy concerning the 11/26/83 conviction
for

possession

/

use

of

a

controlled

Sentencing Transcript, pp. 34-35).
17

substance

(03/17/05

After alerting the trial court to the inaccuracy, the trial
court failed to duly consider the information or make findings on
the record

as to whether the information objected

to by Ms.

Reddish was accurate.

Further, the trial court failed to make a

determination

record

on

the

of

whether

the

information

was

relevant to the issue of sentencing.

III. APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MS. REDDISH OF
HER SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO REQUEST
THAT THE TRIAL COURT UTILIZE ITS FACT FINDING
FUNCTION TO RESOLVE THE INACCURACY.
The United States Supreme Court, in Strickland

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), established a two-prong test
for determining

when a defendant's

Sixth Amendment3

effective assistance of counsel has been denied.
S.Ct. at 2064.

Id.

right

to

at 687, 104

This test - adopted by Utah courts - requires a

defendant to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment
and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."
Bundy

v.

Deland,

763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); State

v.

899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wright,
3

Perry,
893

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in
relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."
18

P.2d

1113, 1119

(Utah Ct. App. 1995).

M T ] he right

to the

effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the
accused

to receive

sentencing.

a fair trial," or, in this case, a fair

Lockhart

v. Fretwell,

506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct.

838, 842, (1993).
To satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant must
w

'identify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances,

'show

that

counsel's

representation

standard of reasonableness.'"

State

(Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland,

fell

v.

below

Templin,

an

objective

805 P.2d 182, 186

466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct.

at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)).

A defendant must "overcome

the

counsel

strong

presumption

that

trial

rendered

adequate

assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment."

State

v. Bullock,

497

791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,

U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990).
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a
defendant

must

proffer

reasonable probability

sufficient

evidence

that, but for counsel's

to

support

"a

unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different."
Strickland,
at 187.

466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin,
U

805 P.2d

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome."
19

Strickland,

466 U.S. at

695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons
1994); State v.

Frame,

v. Barnes,

871 P. 2d 516, 522 (Utah

723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).

Appointed trial counsel's failure to request that the trial
court utilize its fact finding function to resolve the inaccuracy
in the presentence investigation report fell below an objective
standard

of

reasonable

professional

judgment.

This

is

demonstrated by existing Utah case law, the plain language of Utah
Code

Ann.

§

77-18-1 (6) (a) ,

and

the

underlying

factual

circumstances of this case.
But for counsel's unprofessional error of failing to request
that the trial court utilize its fact finding function, the result
at sentencing would have been different.

By alerting the trial

court of its obligation, the trial court more likely than not
would

have

presentence

duly

considered

investigation

the

inaccuracy

report, which,

set

forth

in

in turn, would

the
have

allowed it to more fully the matters presented during sentencing.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Reddish respectfully requests
that this Court reverse her convictions and remand the case to the

20

district

court

for further proceedings consistent with this

Court's instructions as set forth in its opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 2

21

day of December, 2005.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused
to be hand-delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following on this //_ day of
December, 2005:
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box l^&S^A
Salt Lakef^CityAm
8^114-0854
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FILED

MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
P.O. Box 618
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: (801)451-4300
Fax:
(801)451-4328

JAN 2 h 2005
SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

AMENDED
INFORMATION

VS.

SHARON KAY REDDISH
DOB: 03/15/1965,
Defendant.

Case No. 041700875

The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant,
either directly or as a party, on or about May 20, 2004 at County of Davis, State of Utah,
committed the crimes of:
COUNT 1
POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (PRIOR), (581)
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) UCA, second degree felony, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the
defendant having been previously convicted of Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled
Substance, did knowingly and intentionally possess or use a controlled substance; to wit
methamphetamine.
COUNT 2
POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (PRIOR), (584)
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) UCA, class A misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the
defendant having been previously convicted of Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled
Substance, did knowingly and intentionally possess or use a controlled substance; to wit
marijuana.

COUNT 3
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, (92) 58-37a-5(l) UCA, class B
misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the defendant did knowingly,
intentionally or recklessly use, or possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant,
propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare,
test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a
controlled substance into the human body.
COUNT 4
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS,
(1171) 41-6-44 UCA, class B misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the
defendant did operate or was in actual physical control of a vehicle, and was under the influence
of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which
rendered the defendant incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
This information is based on evidence obtained from witness Cory Galbraith.
Authorized this Z ^ f e y of
for presentment and filing:

TT^

MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney

Deputy Davis County Attorney
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1

Q

2

And it's not true that you told the officer that

the money was yours from seven years ago?

3

A

4

Uh-huh. [affirmative]. That's right.

Seven years

before, meaning what?

5

Q

6

prior?

7

A

No.

8

Q

I don't know.

9

That the money was, was in the bag from seven years

But, what's that mean?
But he didn't state that?

You

didn't state that?

10

A

We didn't this conversation that he said we had.

11

Q

Okay.

12

A

He never even told me what I was being arrested

13

for, actually.

14

Q

Okay.

15

A

I found out in jail.

16

Q

But you did tell the officer that you had a prior

17

conviction for meth?

18

A

19

brag about.

20

Seven years -

No, I did not.

I never did.

No.

It's nothing I

MR. DRAGE: Your Honor, I would object to that as

21

well.

22

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen.

23

issue which the Court has to resolve at this point.

24

Sometimes these legal issues need to be resolved outside the

25

presence of the jury and the reason for that is that the
!

There is a legal

210

1

resolution of the issue relates to facts, some of which may

2

be admissible and some of which may not.

3

the jury to step outside.

4

go back to the jury room, we'll take care of the legal issue

5

then, and invite you back.

That's why we ask

So, we're going to excuse you to

6

Please stand, ladies and gentlemen.

7

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom)

8

THE COURT: Please be seated.

9

Mr. Drage?

10

MR. DRAGE: Yes, Your Honor.

My objection is to

11

reference in regard to her prior criminal conviction for, I

12

believe it was a felony possession of methamphetamine.

13

the objection is that it's an improper reference to a prior

14

bad act.

15

does not out way the prejudicial affect whereby, I believe

16

the jury would probably say, "Once a user, always a user,"

17

and may improperly convict her based upon conduct that

18

occurred seven years ago as opposed to conduct - six years

19

ago, as opposed to conduct which occurs on this May 20th

20

2004.

Now

As a result of that the probative value is not,

21

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Poll, please?

22

MR. POLL: Yes, Your Honor.

First of all, with

23

regard to 404B I believe that it is admissible because under

24

404B it's an exception to excluding prior bad acts and

25

convictions is intent and the defense has placed that in
211

1

issue in their opening statement.

2

bolstered by Ms. Reddish's testimony to this point that she

3

was innocently in the proximity of the drugs, that she did

4

not have any intent to possess those drug items, and that she

5

did not have - well, she frankly just did not have the mens

6

rea or intent and therefore, 404B is an inclusive doctrine

7

that allows us to bring in those prior bad acts.

8

fact that there is a conviction bolsters that as opposed to

9

just a bad act.

10

I think that at least

Also, the

We have an actual conviction.

Further, the defendant made the statements to the

11

officer.

Now, she can deny that she made them but she, a

12

defendant has to be, I guess, responsible for the statements

13

that they make and that based upon the principal that

14

admissions by a party opponent are admissible.

15

least ask her about her statements.

16

ask her about whether the conviction actually occurred based

17

on 404B and the fact that defense counsel also brought up

18

these issues, not once, not twice, but several times with the

19

officer while he was on the stand and continued along those

20

line of questioning about their conversation about her prior

21

meth use five, six, or seven years ago and her prior

22

conviction.

So I can at

But I think I can also

So, I think the door is open as well.

23

MS. REDDISH: Can I address the court?

24

THE COURT: No, ma'am.

25

In connection with your comment, counsel, if it's

You can't.

212

1

true that on cross examination you can inquire the

2

conversation that a defendant may have with a police officer,

3

but that conversation has to be measured and looked at in

4

light of 404B, if indeed it deals with bad acts.

5

understand that you're seeking this testimony based upon the

6

exception to 404 which in effect deals with intent, which is

7

part of the issues, part of the elements of this case.

And I

Is

8 I that correct?
9

MR. POLL: That's correct.

10

THE COURT: Counsel, do you wish to respond?

11

MR. DRAGE: Yes, Your Honor.

Briefly.

I'll start

12

first with the statements that she has said, or what's she's

13

alleged to have said and she has already denied those.

14

we've satisfied that purpose.

15

officer as to what their conversation was, the officer did

16

make reference to use.

17

conviction.

18

six years, seven years ago, but never mentioned the word

19

conviction, whether the officer meant to or not.

20
21
22

So

As far as my inquiry with the

He never made reference to the actual

So he said she said this, she used five years,

THE COURT: Well, interestingly, 404B, in terms of
prior bad acts doesn't require a conviction.
MR. DRAGE: Correct.

And then, I guess that's my

23

next point, Your Honor.

404B, there is an exception, yes.

24

And the court first has to find and Brandon has delineated

25

that as being an exception.

But then the next step is, we do
213

have an exception but the court then, on its final step, has
to weigh does the properative value - Brandon's argument is
does the probative value showing intent outweigh the
prejudicial value.

And I would argue no, that it's

prejudicial, that it's the fear that the jury will convict
her based upon prior use, conviction or not, as opposed to
impartially deciding on the events that happened on May 20th
of 2004.

So I would argue that there is the exception we

acknowledge and recognize that being an exception.

But there

is the final problem which is to weigh the probative versus
the prejudicial value.
THE COURT: Alright, thank you.

Counsel, as I

understand the 404B application, there are three elements
that the court must consider.

The first element is whether

or not the particular prior bad act, conviction or not, falls
within one of the exceptions.

One of the exceptions is

intent and in this case given the context in which the issue
arises, intent is a very real issue.

The Court therefore

finds that the exception would apply.
The next point of inquiry is whether or not the
testimony dealing with the exception is, in fact, relevant
and in this case the relevancy is very real because it would
help the finder of fact to determine whether or not the
alleged drugs or the drugs that were found in the vehicle
were drugs there for the purpose of use and was intended to
214

1

be used by the defendant.

2

relevant.

3

Therefore, it is certainly

Then based upon 403 of the Rules of Evidence the

4

court must determine, even though it falls within the

5

exception, and even though it's relevant, the court must

6

balance the properative value of the testimony against the

7

prejudicial value.

8

where the defendant's vehicle was stopped.

9

certain investigations were conducted by the police officer,

In this case what we have is a situation
Ultimately after

10

the car was searched and a blue, I'll call it a bag, was

11

found in which there were numerous items of drugs, namely,

12

methamphetamine and marijuana.

13

paraphernalia.

14

information contained within the car was information which

15

the defendant in this case intended to use or based upon the

16

charges pending, intended to possess.

17

possessed them or used them, either one would fit that

18

element of the charge.

19

have in this case, I understand, a denial of that on the part

20

of the defendant and also a witness that I understand is

21

going to testify claiming that the particular bag belonged to

22

another person other than the defendant who was the only one

23

present that night and the bag was behind the driver's seat

24

in her car.

25

in the court's view, is significantly important.

In addition there was drug

The question then becomes whether or not the

Because whether she

Intent becomes very significant.

We

Therefore, evidence that deals with her intent,
And given
215

the context of this case the court concludes that the
2

probative value on the i ntent issue rises above the level of

3

the prejudicial issue.
All evidence, per say, in these kinds of cases, the

4

But the question is,

5

defendant could say was prejudicial

6

balanced against the probative value, is it unfair for that

7

evidence to come in, And[ the court concludes that it is; not,

8

for reasons that I've indicated because the probative value

9

is greater than the prejudicial value.

Based thereon, the

10

court therefore overrules the objection and will allow the

11

evidence in.

12

But I hasten to point out that when the jury comes

13

back in, I will advise them that I have overruled the

14

objection.

15

instruction that they are to use the testimony relative to

16

any prior conviction only on the issue as to whether or not

17

the defendant intended the use with respect to the point in

18

time that is now of issue.

19

be considered by the jury.

But I will caution the jury by way of legal

For any other reason, it's not to

20

Any further comment from either side?

21

MR. POLL: They'll be instructed that intent as to

22

use or possession at the time?

23

THE COURT: At the time and for no other purpose.

24

MR. POLL: No further questions.

25

THE COURT: [inaudible]
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2nd District - Varmi nqfAn f(WWfRlCT CQIJRJ
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 041700875 FS

SHARON KAYE REDDISH,
Defendant.
Custody: Bail

Judge:
Date:

DARWIN C. HANSEN
March 31, 2005

PRESENT
Clerk:
glendap
Prosecutor: POLL, BRANDON L
Defendant
Defendants Attorney(s) : ARRINGTON, C MARKLEY
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: March 15, 1965
Video
Tape Number:
3/31/05
Tape Count: 10.39&10.50
CHARGES
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not: Guilty - Disposition: 01/25/2005 Guilty
2. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/25/2005 Guilty
3. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/25/2005 Guilty
4. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/25/2005 Guilty

Criminal Sentence, Judgment, Commitment @J

041700875

Pacre 1

JD18388813
REDDISH,SHARON KAYE

Case No: 041700875
Date:
Mar 31, 2005
HEARING
The Court appoints Attorney Scott Wiggins for the defendant's
appeal. The defendant's Motion to Review the Motion to Disqualify
is denied.
The defendant requests to be sent to the prison. The request is
denied.
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints SCOTT L WIGGINS to
represent the defendant.
Appointed Counsel:
Name:
Address:
City:
Phone:

SCOTT L WIGGINS
57 W 200 S STE 105
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
(801)328-4333

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) in the Davis County Jail.
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) in the Davis County Jail. The
total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s).
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to
a term of 180 day(s) in the Davis County Jail. The total time
PacrA 0

Case No: 041700875
Date:
Mar 31, 2005
suspended for this charge is 180 day(s).
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALC/DRUGS a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a
term of 180 day(s) in the Davis County Jail. The total time
suspended for this charge is 180 day(s).
SENTENCE JAIL RELEASE TIME NOTE
The defendant may be released to an in-patient substance abuse
program after having served at least 90 days.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

Charge

2

Fine: $2500. 00
Suspended: $2500. 00
Due: $0.00

Charge # 3

Fine: $1850.00
Suspended: $1850.00
Due: $0.00

Charge # 4

Fine: $1850.00
Suspended: $1850.00
Due: $0.00

#

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$10000.00
$8500.00
$702.70
$1500.00

$16200.00
$14700.00
$702.70
$1500.00
Plus Interest

Paae 3

Case No: 041700875
Date:
Mar 31, 2005
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Davis County Jail.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1500.00 which includes the surcharge,
Interest may increase the final amount due.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
CONDUCT: Commit no further violations of the law.
DRUGS: Do not use or possess controlled substance or be in the
presence of those who use, possess or distribute controlled
substances.
TESTING: Submit to body fluids testing for evidence of drug or
alcohol use.
EVALUATION: Evaluation by Davis County Alcohol and Drug or Davis
County Behavioral Health and successful completion of any program
that they suggest.
PROGRAM/TREATMENT: Enter, participate in and complete any program,
counseling or treatment as directed by AP&P.
SEARCH CONSENT: Submit to search of person, premises or vehicle
and seizure of any evidence without a search warrant at the request
of police or probation officer, if they have reasonable cause.
AP&P CONDITIONS: Complete any other terms or conditions or
probation as required by AP&P and sign a probation agreement.
Complete DNA testing and pay the fee.
Dated this

¥•

day of

.WIN C.
District Court Judge
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
REDDISH, Sharon Kay
PAGE 5

B-

Adult Record:

Date

Agency

Offense

Disposition

11-26-83

Davis Co. S.O.

Poss/UseofC/S

Convicted, 30 days
confinement, $106 fine

06-01-98

Davis Co. S.O.

Illegal Poss/Use of C/S
Third Degree Felony;
Illegal Poss/Use of C/S,
Class B Misd.

Convicted, 18 mos
probation, $185 fine

05-21-04

Clearfield P.D.

Illegal Poss/use of C/S,
Second Degree Felony;
Illegal Poss/Use of C/S,
Class A Misd;
Poss of Para,
Class B Misd;
Driving Under Influence
And/or Drugs,
Class B Misd.

Current offense

C.

Pending Cases:

The defendant denied having any other pending matters.
D.

Gang Affiliations:

The defendant denied having been affiliated with any street gangs.
E.

Probation/Parole History:

The defendant denied having been placed on supervised probation as a juvenile. Records of the
Utah Juvenile Court failed to reveal a supervision history. Ms. Reddish denied having been on
supervised probation as an adult. A check with records of Adult Probation and Parole failed to
reveal a supervision history for the defendant in Utah.
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT/RESTITUTION:
There ai-e no victims identified in this matter and no restitution is owing.

